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OPINION  OF  THE  COURT 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
New Jersey’s system of pretrial release has long relied 
on monetary bail to ensure the presence of an accused person 
at trial. State v. Robinson, 160 A.3d 1, 5 (N.J. 2017). But in 
2017, following an amendment to its Constitution, the New 
Jersey Criminal Justice Reform Act took effect. It replaced 
New Jersey’s former monetary bail system with a new 
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framework that prioritizes the use of non-monetary conditions 
of release over monetary bail to secure a criminal defendant’s 
pretrial liberty. 
Brittan Holland and Lexington National Insurance 
Corporation challenge this feature of the Reform Act as a 
violation of the Eighth Amendment, the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Fourth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution. They seek a preliminary 
injunction enjoining Kelly Rosen, the Team Leader for 
Pretrial Services in the Criminal Division of the Superior 
Court of New Jersey, Mary E. Colalillo, the Camden County 
Prosecutor, and Christopher S. Porrino, the Attorney General 
of New Jersey, and their agents (for convenience we refer to 
the named officials and their agents collectively as the 
“State”), “from taking any actions to enforce statutory 
provisions [of the Reform Act] . . . that allow imposition of 
severe restrictions on the pre-trial liberty of presumptively 
innocent criminal defendants without offering the option of 
monetary bail.” Proposed Order of Plaintiffs Granting Motion 
for a Temporary Restraining Order and a Preliminary 
Injunction at 2, Holland v. Rosen, 277 F. Supp. 3d 707 (2017) 
(No. 17–4317). 
After considering the standing of Holland and 
Lexington to bring suit, we conclude, as did the District Court 
(per Judge Simandle), that only the former may make the 
challenge here. On the merits, the question key to Holland’s 
contentions is whether there is a federal constitutional right to 
deposit money or obtain a corporate surety bond to ensure a 
criminal defendant’s future appearance in court as an equal 
alternative to non-monetary conditions of pretrial release. Our 
answer is no. Thus we affirm the District Court’s 
comprehensive and well-reasoned ruling. 
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I. Background 
A.  New Jersey Pretrial Release and Detention 
Prior to the Criminal Justice Reform Act 
Prior to the Reform Act, New Jersey’s system of 
pretrial release relied heavily on the use of monetary bail, 
requiring defendants to post either cash or arrange with a 
third party a bond for their release. Robinson, 160 A.3d at 5; 
N.J. Att’y Gen. Law Enf’t Dir. 2016–6, at 9 (2016) (“AG Dir. 
2016–6”); Chief Justice Stuart Rabner et al., Report of the 
Joint Committee on Criminal Justice 26 (2014) (“JCCJ 
Report”). Some defendants were released on personal 
recognizance (that is, undertaking a personal obligation to 
appear) or unsecured appearance bond (making a personal 
promise to pay, and sometimes obtaining a co-signor’s 
promise to pay, a sum of money in the event of flight). See 
State v. Rice, 350 A.2d 95, 99 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 
1975). For most, however, release on bail required the 
security of cash deposited with the court equal to the full 
amount of bail set, ten-percent cash bail, corporate surety 
bond, or property bond. JCCJ Report at 21–22. There was a 
presumption in favor of full cash bail for certain bail-
restricted offenses. For most other offenses defendants were 
presumed to have a ten-percent cash bail option, id. at 22, 
which allowed them to deposit ten percent of the sum with the 
court and undertake a personal recognizance for the 
remainder. State v. Moncrieffe, 386 A.2d 886, 887 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978). Alternatively, defendants could 
post a corporate surety bond from an insurance company, 
which, after collecting a non-refundable fee from them and 
sometimes requiring collateral, executed a contract with the 
court and became responsible for the full amount of bail if the 
defendants failed to appear in court. JCCJ Report at 22. A 
final option was to post a property bond, for which defendants 
or their surety pledged real property, such as a deed to a 
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house. Id. The court in setting bail was only authorized to 
consider the risk of flight of defendants and was not 
authorized to consider any danger they may have presented. 
AG Dir. 2016–6, at 9; JCCJ Report at 19. 
In 2012 two organizations—the Drug Policy Alliance 
and Luminosity—studied New Jersey’s county jails and 
found that 73.3% of those held in custody were awaiting trial, 
and 38.5% of the total jail population had the option to post 
bail but were in custody due only to their inability to meet the 
terms of bail. Marie VanNostrand, New Jersey Jail Population 
Analysis 11, 13 (2013) (“VanNostrand Report”). One in eight 
inmates—12% of the total population—was in custody 
because he or she could not pay $2,500 or less.1 Id. at 13. The 
median length of stay for pretrial detainees was 314 days. Id. 
at 12. 
The State took steps to address these inequities. 
Governor Christie called in 2012 for a constitutional 
amendment to allow for pretrial detention in serious cases. 
See Office of the Courts, Criminal Justice Reform: Annual 
Report to the Governor & Legislature 1 (2016). And in 2013 
Chief Justice Rabner established the Joint Committee on 
Criminal Justice, “comprised of judges, prosecutors, public 
defenders, private counsel, court administrators[,] and staff 
from the Legislature and [the] Governor’s office.” JCCJ 
Report at 1. 
In a March 2014 report the Committee examined the 
consequences of the State’s then-current bail system and 
recommended a major change to its approach. Id. In practice, 
the State’s reliance on monetary bail resulted in the release of 
                                              
1 This statistic represents those defendants for whom bail was 
set at $250,000 or less, with the assumption they had a ten-
percent cash bail option. See VanNostrand Report at 13. 
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defendants who could afford to pay for their release, even if 
they posed a substantial risk of flight or danger to others, and 
the pretrial detention of poorer defendants who presented 
minimal risk and were accused of less serious crimes. Id. at 
1–2. The report, supported by extensive research, found 
significant consequences to pretrial custody: defendants 
detained in jail while awaiting trial pled guilty more often, 
were convicted more often, were sentenced to prison more 
often, and received harsher prison sentences, than those 
released before trial. Id. The Committee sought to promote 
defendants’ liberty interests by shifting from a “resource-
based” to a “risk-based” system of bail that relies heavily on 
release (with non-monetary conditions to address defendants’ 
particular risks) rather than pretrial detention. Id. at 2–3. The 
Committee did not recommend the abolition of monetary bail, 
though it did expect that relying on particular, and often 
nuanced, conditions would result in monetary bail being set 
with far less frequency. Id. at 61. 
The Legislature ultimately adopted a proposal to 
amend the State Constitution as follows: 
All persons shall, before conviction, be eligible 
for pretrial release. Pretrial release may be 
denied to a person if the court finds that no 
amount of monetary bail, non-monetary 
conditions of pretrial release, or combination of 
monetary bail and non-monetary conditions 
would reasonably assure the person’s 
appearance in court when required, or protect 
the safety of any other person or the 
community, or prevent the person from 
obstructing or attempting to obstruct the 
criminal justice process. It shall be lawful for 
the Legislature to establish by law procedures, 
terms, and conditions applicable to pretrial 
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release and the denial thereof authorized under 
this provision. 
N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 11 (2017). The Legislature also drafted the 
Criminal Justice Reform Act to implement changes to the 
State’s bail system and provide for more timely trials.2 The 
Act, described in greater detail below, stemmed from the 
passage of the proposed constitutional amendment, which 
voters approved by a margin of 61.8% to 38.2% in November 
2014. See Div. of Elections, Dep’t of State, Official List: 
Public Question Results for 11/04/2014 General Election 
Public Question No. 1, at 1 (Dec. 2, 2014). Both the 
amendment and the Act took effect on January 1, 2017. 
B.  The Reform Act 
The Reform Act’s three goals are “primarily [to] rely[] 
upon pretrial release by non-monetary means to reasonably 
assure an eligible defendant’s appearance in court when 
required, the protection of the safety of any other person or 
the community, [and] that the eligible defendant will not 
obstruct or attempt to obstruct the criminal justice process.”3 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:162–15 (2017). Importantly, the Act 
applies only to “eligible defendants”—those issued “a 
                                              
2 The speedy trial reforms are not implicated by this appeal. 
They can be found at N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:162–22 (2017).  
 
3 The Act presumes there is a reasonable assurance the 
eligible defendant will not obstruct or attempt to obstruct the 
criminal justice process unless the prosecutor provides the 
court with contrary information relevant to that risk. Id. 
§ 2A:162–17(e). As such, it is mentioned below only 
generally and not with respect to Holland personally. 
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complaint-warrant . . . for an initial charge involving an 
indictable offense or a disorderly persons offense.” Id. A 
defendant charged by a complaint-summons will be released 
from custody and is not subject to the Act. Id. § 2A:162–
16(d)(1). 
The Reform Act establishes a multi-step process the 
court must follow when deciding to release or detain an 
eligible defendant. First, he or she is temporarily detained to 
allow the Pretrial Services Program (“Pretrial Services”) to 
prepare a Public Safety Assessment and recommendation for 
release conditions and for the court to issue a pretrial release 
decision. Id. § 2A:162–16(a).  
The Public Safety Assessment model, developed by 
the Laura and John Arnold Foundation, considers nine factors 
to measure the risk an eligible defendant will fail to appear in 
court and the risk he or she will engage in new criminal 
activity while on release. See American Civil Liberties Union 
of New Jersey et al., New Jersey Pretrial Justice Manual 7, 8 
(2016) (“ACLU Pretrial Justice Manual”). The Assessment 
for each eligible defendant is based on relevant information 
gathered from his or her electronic court records. AG Dir. 
2016–6, at 27. The eligible defendant’s risks for failure to 
appear and for new criminal activity are graded on a scale of 
one to six, with six being the greatest risk. He or she may also 
be flagged for new violent criminal activity. Id. These scores 
map onto a Decision-Making Framework that recommends a 
pretrial monitoring level based on the intersection of failure to 
appear and new criminal activity scores, the new violent 
criminal activity flag (should there be one), and other factors. 
Id.; see also Pretrial Release Recommendation Decision 
Making Framework (DMF) (March 2018). 
Level 1 recommends eligible defendants report once a 
month by phone. Level 2 recommends monthly telephonic 
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reporting, monthly in-person reporting, and some monitored 
conditions (e.g., a curfew). Level 3 recommends weekly 
telephonic or in-person monitoring and monitored conditions. 
Level 3+ recommends all the same conditions as level 3 plus 
electronic monitoring and/or home detention. If release is not 
recommended, the matrix suggests the eligible defendant be 
detained pretrial or, if released, ordered to comply with level 
3+ conditions. ACLU Pretrial Justice Manual at 10. 
The eligible defendant’s first appearance must occur 
no later than 48 hours after his or her commitment to jail, 
subject to certain exceptions. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:162–
16(b)(1). At the first appearance the court must make a 
pretrial release decision unless the prosecutor files a motion 
for detention, in which case it will hold a separate pretrial 
detention hearing. Id. §§ 2A:162–17, 2A:162–18(a)(1). In 
general, that hearing must occur no later than the eligible 
defendant’s first appearance, or three working days from the 
date the motion for detention was filed, unless the eligible 
defendant or prosecutor seeks a continuance. Id. § 2A:162–
19(d)(1).  
Not all eligible defendants may be detained pretrial. 
Rather, a prosecutor may only move to detain an eligible 
defendant charged with certain crimes, and the court must 
find clear and convincing evidence that no condition, or 
combination of monetary and non-monetary conditions, of 
release can reasonably assure the Act’s goals. Id. §§ 2A:162–
15, 2A:162–18(a)(1), 2A:162–19(a), (e)(3).  
At the pretrial detention hearing, the eligible defendant 
has the right to counsel and to have counsel appointed if he or 
she is financially unable to obtain representation. He or she is 
also afforded the opportunity to testify, present witnesses, 
cross-examine witnesses, and present information by proffer 
or otherwise. Id. § 2A:162–19(e)(1). The eligible defendant 
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may also subpoena and call the State’s witnesses. ACLU 
Pretrial Justice Manual at 42. Rules concerning admissibility 
of evidence in criminal trials do not apply to this hearing. N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 2A:162–19(e)(1). Further, the eligible defendant 
is entitled to significant discovery for the detention hearing, 
including that the prosecutor’s office shall provide “any 
available preliminary law enforcement incident report 
concerning the offense and the affidavit of probable cause,” 
along with all statements or reports relating to the affidavit, 
evidence the State relies on to establish probable cause at the 
hearing, and the risk factors that the State advances at the 
hearing. N.J. Ct. R. 3:4–2(c)(1) (2017). The prosecutor’s 
office must also provide all exculpatory evidence. Id. If there 
is no indictment, the prosecutor must establish probable cause 
that the eligible defendant committed the predicate offense. 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:162–19(e)(2). 
 
The court may take into account numerous factors to 
determine whether to detain the eligible defendant. They 
include, for example, the nature of the offense charged, the 
history and characteristics of the eligible defendant, the nature 
and seriousness of his or her risk of danger, and the release 
recommendation of Pretrial Services. Id. § 2A:162–20. If the 
court orders detention, it must include written findings of fact 
(along with a statement of the reasons for detention) and 
direct that the eligible defendant be afforded a reasonable 
opportunity for private consultation with counsel. Id. 
§ 2A:162–21(a). An eligible defendant ordered detained is 
entitled to appeal that decision in an expedited manner. Id. 
§ 2A:162–18(c). Additionally, the hearing may be reopened 
at any time before trial if the court finds information that was 
not known to the prosecutor or the eligible defendant at the 
time of the hearing and that has a material bearing on whether 
there are conditions of release that will reasonably assure the 
Act’s goals. Id. § 2A:162–19(f). 
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If the court does not order detention, it must determine 
what release conditions, if any, should be imposed on the 
eligible defendant. Id. § 2A:162–18(d). It needs to consider 
all the circumstances, the Public Safety Assessment and 
recommendation for release conditions, plus any information 
provided by a prosecutor or the eligible defendant. Id. 
§§ 2A:162–16(b)(2), 2A:162–17(a). Based on this 
information, the court shall order him or her to be released on 
personal recognizance or on execution of an unsecured 
appearance bond if either option would reasonably assure the 
Act’s goals. Id. §§ 2A:162–16(b)(2)(a), 2A:162–17(a). If not, 
the court may order him or her released on a non-monetary 
condition or combination of conditions, “with the condition or 
conditions being the least restrictive . . . that the court 
determines will reasonably assure” the Act’s goals. Id. 
§ 2A:162–16(b)(2)(b); see also id. § 2A:162–17(b). If none of 
the above will reasonably assure those goals, the court may 
order the eligible defendant released on monetary bail, other 
than unsecured appearance bond, to assure his or her 
appearance in court (but not to assure a person or the 
community’s safety), or a combination of monetary bail and 
non-monetary conditions to assure the goals that apply. Id. 
§§ 2A:162–16(b)(2)(c), 2A:162–17(c)(1), (d)(1), 2A:162–
18(a)(2).  
The release conditions imposed may require, at the 
minimum, that the eligible defendant refrain from committing 
any offense during release, avoid all communication with an 
alleged victim of the crime, avoid communication with 
specified witnesses who may testify concerning the charged 
offense, and comply with “any one or more non-monetary 
conditions” in the statute. Id. § 2A:162–17(b)(1). These non-
monetary conditions include that the eligible defendant: 
(a) remain in the custody of a designated person . . . ; 
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(b) maintain employment, or, if unemployed, actively 
seek employment; 
(c) maintain or commence an educational program; 
(d) abide by specified restrictions on personal 
associations, place of abode, or travel; 
(e) report on a regular basis to a designated law 
enforcement agency, or other agency, or pretrial 
services program; 
(f) comply with a specified curfew; 
(g) refrain from possessing a firearm, destructive 
device, or other dangerous weapon; 
(h) refrain from excessive use of alcohol, or any use of 
a narcotic drug or other controlled substance 
without a prescription . . . ; 
(i) undergo available medical, psychological, or 
psychiatric treatment, including treatment for drug 
or alcohol dependency, and remain in a specified 
institution if required for that purpose; 
(j) return to custody for specified hours following 
release for employment, schooling, or other limited 
purposes; 
(k) be placed in a pretrial home supervision capacity 
with or without the use of an approved electronic 
monitoring device . . . ; or 
(l) satisfy any other condition that is necessary to 
reasonably assure [the Act’s goals].  
 
Id. § 2A:162–17(b)(2). If the court orders conditions contrary 
to the Public Safety Assessment’s recommendation, it must 
provide an explanation for its decision in the document that 
authorizes the eligible defendant’s release. Id. § 2A:162–
23(a)(2). Additionally, the State Superior Court may later 
review conditions of release on its own motion, or a motion 
by the prosecutor or the eligible defendant, alleging there has 
been a “material change in circumstance that justifies a 
change in conditions.” N.J. Ct. R. 3:26–2(c)(2). Any review 
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of conditions under this rule must be decided within 30 days 
of the date the motion was filed and the judge may set new 
conditions of release on a finding that there has been a 
material change in circumstances. Id.  
The State has released statistics on pretrial release and 
detention for the year following the Reform Act’s 
implementation. In 2017 142,663 defendants were charged by 
either a complaint-warrant or a complaint-summons. Of 
those, 44,319 defendants were issued a complaint-warrant. 
Prosecutors filed 19,366 motions for pretrial detention, and 
courts ordered 8,043 eligible defendants detained. The pretrial 
detention rate for all eligible defendants was 18.1%, and the 
overall pretrial detention rate (considering complaint-warrants 
and complaint-summonses) was 5.6%. See Office of the 
Courts, Criminal Justice Reform: Annual Report to the 
Governor & Legislature 4 (2017) (“CJR Report 2017”). 
Pretrial monitoring level 3+ was ordered for 8.3% of eligible 
defendants. See Initial Release Decisions for Criminal Justice 
Reform Eligible Defendants (January 1 – December 31, 2017) 
(“Initial Release Decisions 2017”). Additionally, judges 
ordered only 44 eligible defendants to post monetary bail in 
2017. Overall, the State’s pretrial jail population was reduced 
by 20%. CJR Report 2017, at 4. 
C.  The Parties 
Holland was arrested in April 2017 for his alleged 
involvement in a bar fight, and he was charged with second-
degree aggravated assault. The Affidavit of Probable Cause in 
support of the criminal complaint noted Holland struck the 
victim in the face in the parking lot outside a bar, then 
continued to strike the victim in the head and face after he fell 
to the ground, causing serious bodily harm. Holland then fled 
the scene and was apprehended at his home with his clothing 
covered in fresh blood. 
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The Camden County Prosecutor’s Office filed a 
motion for pretrial detention due to the severity of Holland’s 
alleged offense and his prior conviction for simple assault. 
The Decision-Making Framework recommended pretrial 
detention in part because the Public Safety Assessment 
flagged Holland for a risk of new violent criminal activity. 
Represented by a Public Defender, Holland negotiated for 
level 3+ non-monetary pretrial release conditions in exchange 
for the prosecutor’s withdrawal of the motion. He appeared in 
court and accepted the negotiated agreement, which included 
home detention and electronic monitoring, and he declined to 
proceed with a pretrial detention hearing. Holland is currently 
on pretrial release with conditions including home detention 
(except for employment) and electronic monitoring. He has 
not sought a judicial determination of his conditions of 
release or any modification of the agreed conditions. 
Lexington is a Florida corporation based in Maryland. 
It operates through independent bail bondsmen who are 
licensed by the New Jersey Department of Banking and 
Insurance and registered with the Superior Court clerk. It 
primarily underwrites bail bonds and acts as a corporate 
surety of bail bonds. 
D.  Procedural History 
Holland and Lexington filed a class action Complaint 
and a Motion for a Preliminary Injunction on June 14, 2017. 
The State then filed an opposition to the injunction motion, to 
which Holland and Lexington replied. The American Civil 
Liberties Union filed a motion for leave to appear as amicus 
curiae on behalf of itself and the ACLU of New Jersey, Drug 
Policy Alliance, Latino Action Network, and National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People – New 
Jersey Conference. The District Court granted the request of 
the national ACLU, which then submitted a brief and 
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participated in oral argument in support of the State. The 
Court convened a preliminary injunction hearing; after 
hearing oral argument, it denied the motion.  
First, the Court considered Holland and Lexington’s 
standing to raise their claims. It held Holland has standing on 
his own (called first-party standing) because his alleged 
injury would be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. 
However, it held that Lexington lacks first-party and third-
party standing, the latter allowing a litigant to assert in certain 
circumstances claims of other parties. The Court reached its 
conclusion about third-party standing after finding Lexington 
had sufficiently alleged injury, but even assuming it has a 
close relationship with criminal defendants, it did not 
sufficiently allege criminal defendants face obstacles to 
pursuing their own claims that only Lexington can address 
adequately. The Court did not opine on whether Lexington’s 
alleged injury fell outside the “zone-of-interests” of the 
Eighth, Fourteenth, and Fourth Amendments. 
Second, in response to the State’s argument that the 
Court must abstain from interfering with Holland’s ongoing 
state criminal prosecution per Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 
(1971), it applied Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) 
(narrowing the scope of Younger abstention), and held 
abstention is not warranted. 
Third, the Court addressed the merits of Holland’s 
motion for a preliminary injunction. It examined the history 
of the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Bail Clause and held 
the argument for the right to monetary bail was unlikely to 
succeed on the merits. The Court then reviewed the 
procedures provided by the Reform Act and concluded the 
statute did not violate procedural due process and, in any 
event, Holland waived the process available to him by 
agreeing to level 3+ conditions. It also held the statute’s 
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subordination of monetary bail did not violate substantive due 
process because Holland did not present any grounds for 
finding an option to obtain monetary bail is a fundamental 
right or is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. Finally, it 
held the conditions imposed on Holland were not an 
unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment because 
the prosecutor had to show there was probable cause for his 
charged offense, and Holland waived the opportunity to have 
a full pretrial detention hearing. 
The Court turned to the likelihood Holland will suffer 
irreparable harm. It held there was scant likelihood of that 
occurring if an injunction were denied because Holland’s 
suggested harm was the deprivation of his constitutional right 
to the option, alongside non-monetary bail, of monetary bail, 
which would have required the Court to hold there was such a 
right. Moreover, it noted Holland still has the ability to seek a 
modification of his conditions of release in the New Jersey 
court. 
The balance of harms weighed against granting the 
requested injunction. The Court noted that such an injunction 
mandating consideration of monetary bail risked reinstalling 
the system of financial requirements that previously relegated 
to pretrial detention those unable to meet modest monetary 
bail requirements. It found the harm to Holland of denying 
the injunction was minimal because, even if monetary bail 
were set for him, he would likely have to pay a non-
refundable bail bond premium. 
Finally, the Court determined the public interest 
disfavors an injunction. It found the reforms implemented by 
the State support the public interest, particularly in light of the 
well-documented shortcomings of the prior monetary bail 
system.  
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II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
The District Court had federal question jurisdiction, 28 
U.S.C. § 1331, and we have jurisdiction over final orders of 
the Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary 
review over challenges to the constitutionality of statutes. 
United States v. Pendleton, 636 F.3d 78, 82 (3d Cir. 2011). 
With respect to the denial of a preliminary injunction, we 
review findings of fact for clear error, legal conclusions de 
novo, and the decision to grant or deny the injunction for an 
abuse of discretion. Del. Strong Families v. Att’y Gen. of 
Del., 793 F.3d 304, 308 (3d Cir. 2015).  
A preliminary injunction “is an extraordinary remedy 
. . . which should be granted only in limited circumstances.” 
Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Winback & Conserve Program, Inc., 
42 F.3d 1421, 1426–27 (3d Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). We 
do not issue that relief “unless the movant, by a clear 
showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” Mazurek v. 
Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam) (citation 
omitted) (emphasis omitted). That burden typically involves 
four factors: (1) a reasonable likelihood of success on the 
merits; (2) irreparable harm to the applicant; (3) whether the 
denial of a preliminary injunction would injure the moving 
party more than the issuance of an injunction would harm the 
non-moving party; and (4) whether the grant of relief would 
serve the public interest. Del. Strong Families, 793 F.3d at 
308. 
The first two factors are prerequisites for a movant to 
prevail. Cf. In re Revel AC, Inc., 802 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 
2015) (citing Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., 749 F.2d 
380, 386 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J.)) (reasoning, in the 
analogous context of a stay pending appeal, the movant must 
demonstrate both of the first two factors). The former requires 
Holland to “demonstrate that [he] can win on the merits 
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(which requires a showing significantly better than negligible 
but not necessarily more likely than not).” Reilly v. City of 
Harrisburg, 858 F.3d 173, 179 (3d Cir. 2017). Because we 
hold Holland has not made that demonstration, we do not 
delve deeply into the second factor, which would require 
Holland to show “that [he] is more likely than not to suffer 
irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief.” Id. 
Though Holland argues irreparable harm exists because he is 
“subjected to severe restrictions of liberty without being 
offered the constitutionally required alternative of monetary 
bail,” Appellants’ Br. at 51–52, we discern in the Eighth, 
Fourteenth, and Fourth Amendments no constitutional 
requirement of monetary bail on the same priority level as 
non-monetary bail. Hence Holland is unlikely to suffer 
irreparable harm absent a preliminary injunction. (And, as the 
District Court noted, he may seek to modify his conditions of 
release in the New Jersey court.) 
 
As Holland has not made the threshold showing on 
both of the prerequisite factors, we do not consider and 
balance the third and fourth factors—“the possibility of harm 
to other interested persons from the grant or denial of the 
injunction[] and . . . the public interest.” Reilly, 858 F.3d at 
176 (citation omitted). 
 
III. Standing 
Before we reach the constitutional questions raised in 
this appeal, we address the parties’ standing. The State argues 
the District Court erred in holding Holland has first-party 
standing because he did not suffer an injury-in-fact and 
because his alleged injury is not redressable by a court. 
Lexington asserts the Court also erred in holding it lacks 
third-party standing because it has a common interest with 
criminal defendants and they face obstacles to appealing their 
pretrial release decisions.  
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For Holland to have standing, he must “have (1) 
suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the 
challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to 
be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. 
Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016). The parties do not 
contest that Holland’s alleged injury is traceable to the State’s 
conduct. Rather, the State raises three arguments contesting 
Holland’s standing. It argues before us that Holland did not 
allege in his Complaint that the “unconstitutional process” 
injured him, but rather it was the imposition of non-monetary 
conditions of pretrial release without considering monetary 
bail as a non-subordinated option. Additionally, it contends 
that, even if monetary bail were considered alongside non-
monetary release conditions, Holland would still be subject to 
restrictive conditions to address his risk to the community or 
other persons. Finally, it asserts Holland failed to carry the 
burden of demonstrating he has an injury-in-fact (i.e., one that 
is real and particular to him, called in constitutional argot 
“concrete and particularized”) in part because he opted out of 
the pretrial detention hearing.  
Each of the State’s arguments fails. First, the State 
reads Holland’s Complaint too narrowly. His prayer for 
relief—a preliminary injunction against imposing “severe 
restrictions on . . . pre-trial liberty . . . without offering the 
option of non-excessive monetary bail”—could fairly be read 
to mean the State court must offer (or have the option to 
offer) monetary bail when setting release conditions. Second, 
even assuming the Act’s process is unconstitutional, the 
District Court correctly determined that if monetary bail were 
required to be considered on equal footing with non-monetary 
release conditions, Holland’s injury—the “unconstitutional 
process”—would be redressed regardless what release 
conditions would be imposed. Cf. Stehney v. Perry, 101 F.3d 
925, 931 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding plaintiff’s injury would be 
redressed by a new employment review). Third, if the Act’s 
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process deprived Holland of a constitutional right, his injury 
would be both concrete and particularized even though he 
opted out of the hearing. Holland contends he did not have 
access to a constitutionally compliant process. If so, this 
affected him personally and in a real way by disallowing him 
the opportunity to have monetary bail set even if he had 
agreed to participate in the process provided. 
 
Lexington does not challenge the District Court’s 
holding that it lacks first-party standing, and instead argues 
on appeal that the Court erred in holding it lacks third-party 
standing. We have recognized the prudential doctrine of third-
party standing, which, to repeat, allows in limited 
circumstances litigants to assert claims based on the rights of 
third parties. See Pa. Psychiatric Soc’y v. Green Spring 
Health Servs., Inc., 280 F.3d 278, 287–88 (3d Cir. 2002). It 
may be appropriate “if a course of conduct prevents a third-
party from entering into a relationship with the litigant 
(typically a contractual relationship), to which relationship 
the third party has a legal entitlement.” Id. at 288 (citation 
omitted) (quotation marks omitted). A plaintiff asserting a 
third-party claim needs to meet three conditions: “[(]1) the 
plaintiff must suffer injury; [(]2) the plaintiff and the third 
party must have a ‘close relationship’; and [(]3) the third 
party must face some obstacles that prevent it from pursuing 
its own claims.” Id. at 288–89. Lexington, as the plaintiff, 
asserts it satisfies each of these conditions: it suffered an 
injury because the Reform Act “all but eliminated” the use of 
monetary bail and bail bonds; it has a common interest with 
criminal defendants like Holland in courts considering 
monetary bail alongside restrictive release conditions; and 
criminal defendants subject to home detention and electronic 
monitoring face obstacles to pursuing litigation themselves 
because of the nature and cost of challenges to pretrial-release 
decisions.  
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The State does not challenge that Lexington has 
sufficiently alleged injury due to its loss of business by the 
Act’s shift away from monetary bail. Even assuming this 
factor is met, Lexington fails to satisfy the second and third 
conditions required for third-party standing—it has no 
relationship, let alone a close relationship, with potential 
criminal defendant-customers. In Kowalski v. Tesmer, the 
Supreme Court considered whether a “future attorney-client 
relationship with as yet unascertained Michigan criminal 
defendants who will request, but be denied, the appointment 
of appellate counsel” based on the operation of a state statute 
met the “close relationship” factor. 543 U.S. 125, 130 (2004) 
(citation omitted) (quotation marks omitted). It held the 
hypothetical relationship was not a “close” one; indeed, “they 
have no relationship at all.” Id. at 131. The closeness of 
Lexington’s hypothetical relationship with potential 
customers closely mirrors that of attorneys with potential 
clients.  
 
We also follow Kowalski to hold Lexington has not 
demonstrated that potential criminal defendant-customers 
face obstacles to pursuing their own claims. The attorneys in 
Kowalski argued indigent defendants are hindered in 
advancing their own constitutional rights because 
“unsophisticated, pro se criminal defendants could not satisfy 
the necessary procedural requirements, and, if they did, they 
would be unable to coherently advance the substance of their 
constitutional claim.” Id. at 132. The Supreme Court rejected 
this “hypothesis” by pointing to examples of pro se criminal 
defendants challenging the denial of appellate counsel. Id. We 
similarly reject Lexington’s hypothesis that criminal 
defendants under home detention and electronic monitoring 
face obstacles to pursuing litigation when Holland appears to 
have the unfettered ability to do so. 
 
23 
 
In this context, Holland has standing to bring his 
constitutional claims. Lexington does not.  
 
IV. Likelihood of Success on the Merits 
 
Holland challenges the Reform Act on the ground 
there is a constitutional right to have the option of posting 
monetary bail to secure pretrial release.4 We address the 
likelihood of success for each constitutional argument in turn. 
A.  Eighth Amendment 
 
The Eighth Amendment to our Constitution provides 
in part that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required.” U.S. 
Const. amend. VIII. It applies to the State of New Jersey 
through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Baker v. McCollan, 
443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979) (internal citation omitted); 
Sistrunk v. Lyons, 646 F.2d 64, 66 (3d Cir. 1981). Though 
there persists a rigorous debate whether the Excessive Bail 
Clause incorporates a “right to bail” inherent in its 
proscription of excessive bail, that is not the question we 
answer today. Even assuming the Eighth Amendment 
provides a “right to bail,” we must determine whether that 
right requires monetary bail (i.e., cash bail or a corporate 
                                              
4 We understand “monetary bail,” as Holland uses the term, to 
refer to only cash bail and corporate surety bonds, 
Appellants’ Br. at 1, 2, 6, 15–16, because he does not mention 
or allude to property bonds and because the Reform Act 
retains unsecured appearance bonds (also a form of monetary 
bail) for those eligible defendants who pose little risk of flight 
and danger. See N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2A:162–16(b)(2)(a), 
2A:162–17(a); see also Rice, 350 A.2d at 99. 
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surety bond) to be considered in line with non-monetary 
release conditions.  
At time of the Constitution, “bail” in criminal cases 
relied on personal sureties—a criminal defendant was 
delivered into the custody of his surety,5 who provided a 
pledge to guarantee the defendant’s appearance at trial and, in 
the event of nonappearance, a sum of money.6 Anthony 
Highmore, A Digest of the Doctrine of Bail; In Civil and 
Criminal Cases, v–vi, 197 (1783). In the English tradition of 
bail that influenced early American practice, the pledge did 
not require any upfront payment to secure the conditional 
promise to pay, and producing the defendant for trial voided 
any later-arising obligation to pay. June Carbone, Seeing 
Through the Emperor’s New Clothes: Rediscovery of Basic 
Principles in the Administration of Bail, 34 Syracuse L. Rev. 
517, 520–21 (1983); F.E. Devine, Commercial Bail Bonding 
5 (1991) (citing William Blackstone, Commentaries on the 
Laws of England 340–42 (Chitty Ed. 1857)); see also Lord 
                                              
5 A defendant in a surety’s custody is not physically confined 
by him; rather, the surety is legally responsible for producing 
the defendant at trial. See Jonathan Drimmer, When Man 
Hunts Man: The Rights and Duties of Bounty Hunters in the 
American Criminal Justice System, 33 Hous. L. Rev. 731, 
746–47 (1996). 
 
6 In his Commentaries, William Blackstone mentions 
defendants sometimes giving a pledge on their own behalf in 
criminal cases (akin to what is now known as an unsecured 
appearance bond), but it appears this practice was less 
common as compared to personal suretyship. F.E. Devine, 
Commercial Bail Bonding 4 (1991) (citing William 
Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 297 
(Chitty Ed. 1857)). 
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Edward Coke, A Treatise of Bail and Mainprize (1635), 
reprinted in Lord Edward Coke & William Hawkins, Three 
Law Tracts 279 (1764) (explaining “bail” derived from the 
French word bailer, meaning “to deliver,” “because he that is 
bailed, is as it were delivered into the hands and custody of 
those that are his pledges and sureties.”). Additionally, unlike 
corporate sureties of today, personal sureties did not receive 
any compensation for making a pledge on behalf of the 
criminal defendant. Devine at 6–7; Peggy M. Tobolowsky & 
James F. Quinn, Pretrial Release in the 1990s: Texas Takes 
Another Look at Nonfinancial Release Conditions, 19 New 
Eng. J. on Crim. & Civ. Confinement 267, 274 (1993). 
The early adoption of a personal surety system is 
reflected in a number of American colonies’ laws. New 
Jersey’s colonial predecessor, for example, provided “[t]hat 
all persons arrested shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, 
unless for capital offences, where the proof is evident or 
presumption great.” Aaron Leaming & Jacob Spicer, The 
Grants, Concessions, and Original Constitutions of the 
Province of New Jersey 235 (2d ed. 1881); see also Sistrunk, 
646 F.2d at 68 n.13. It is in this context numerous colonies 
prohibited excessive bail. See, e.g., Cobb v. Aytch, 643 F.2d 
946, 958–60 n.7 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc) (citing Virginia Bill 
of Rights § 9 (1776); Massachusetts Bill of Rights art. XXVI 
(1780)).  
Prior to the ratification of the United States 
Constitution, the Northwest Ordinance created a federal 
statutory right to bail that replicated that of New Jersey. See 
Northwest Ordinance, 1 Stat. at Large 52, art. 2 (1787) (“All 
persons shall be bailable, unless for capital offences where 
the proof shall be evident or the presumption great.”). After 
its ratification, the Judiciary Act of 1789 did largely the same. 
See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 33, 1 Stat. 73, 91 (“[B]ail 
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shall be admitted, except where the punishment may be death 
. . . .”).  
By contrast, the Constitution’s Bill of Rights, through 
the Eighth Amendment, prohibited excessive bail. The 
Amendment was taken, with minimal alteration, from the 
English Bill of Rights of 1689. In England that clause was not 
thought to afford a right to bail in all cases, “but merely to 
provide that bail shall not be excessive in those cases where it 
is proper to grant bail.” United States v. Perry, 788 F.2d 100, 
111 (3d Cir. 1986) (quoting Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 
545 (1952)); see also Bill of Rights, 1 W. & M. st. 2, c. 2, 
preamble, cl. 10 (1689). In a similar vein, many states’ 
constitutions, including that of New Jersey, separately 
guaranteed bail by sufficient sureties for non-capital offenses 
and prohibited excessive bail.7 N.J Const. of 1844, art. I, 
¶¶ 10, 15 (1844); see also Caleb Foote, Coming 
Constitutional Crisis in Bail, 113 U. Pa. L. Rev. 959, 975 
(1965). 
In the context of the early personal surety bail system, 
the Eighth Amendment prohibited the demand that a surety 
pledge an excessive sum of money to secure the defendant’s 
release. See United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 55, 62 (Va. Cir. 
Ct. 1807). Thus personal surety bail may be characterized as a 
form of monetary bail, in that the surety agreed to pay a sum 
of money if the defendant failed to appear. But Holland does 
not argue the Amendment provides a right to personal surety 
bail; rather, he asserts the Amendment provides a right to 
pretrial release secured by cash bail or corporate surety bond. 
                                              
7 As in England, courts sometimes allowed defendants to 
make a pledge on their own behalf (alone or with third parties 
as co-signors). See Respublica v. Burns, 1 Yeates 370, 370 
(Pa. 1794). 
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He has not shown, however, that “bail” at the time of the 
Constitution’s ratification contemplated either of these two 
forms of monetary bail, and we find no evidence that they 
were in practice at that time. Hence, even if the Eighth 
Amendment provides a “right to bail,” we do not construe its 
original meaning to include a right to make a cash deposit or 
to obtain a corporate surety bond to secure pretrial release. 
Contemporary definitions of “bail” reflect its early 
form and a broader meaning that has taken hold over time. 
“Bail,” in the criminal justice context, is defined variously as: 
(1) “the custody of a prisoner or one under arrest by one who 
procures the release of the prisoner or arrested individual by 
giving surety for his due appearance;” (2) “the security or 
obligation given for the due appearance of a prisoner in order 
to obtain his release from imprisonment;” (3) “the temporary 
delivery or release of a prisoner upon security for his due 
appearance;” (4) “one that agrees to assume legal liability for 
a money forfeit or damages if a prisoner released on bail fails 
to make his due appearance in court;” and (5) “the process by 
which a person is released from custody.” Bail, Webster’s 
Third New Int’l Dictionary 163 (1971). The last iteration is 
how we often think of bail colloquially: a means of achieving 
pretrial release from custody conditioned on adequate 
assurances. 
The Supreme Court’s use of “bail” since the middle of 
the Twentieth Century points to this broader definition. In 
Stack v. Boyle, the Court described a statutory “right to bail” 
as the “traditional right to freedom before conviction,” and 
“[t]he right to release before trial . . . conditioned upon the 
accused’s giving adequate assurance that he will stand trial 
and submit to sentence if found guilty.” 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951). 
The early practice of bail was the “securing [of] oaths of 
responsible persons to stand as sureties for the accused,” 
whereas the practice in the 1950s was “requiring a bail bond 
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or a deposit of a sum of money subject to forfeiture [to] 
serve[] as additional assurance of the presence of an 
accused.” Id. at 5. Bail is a “conditional privilege” that 
enables accused persons “to stay out of jail until a trial has 
found them guilty.” Id. at 8 (Jackson, J., concurring).  
In United States v. Salerno, the Supreme Court 
addressed a constitutional challenge to the Bail Reform Act of 
1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141–3150, contending that it violates the 
Excessive Bail Clause because it allows a court to set bail and 
order detention for reasons not related to risk of flight. 481 
U.S. 739, 752–53 (1987). The Court held the Act did not 
violate the Eighth Amendment because “[t]he only arguable 
substantive limitation of the [Excessive] Bail Clause is that 
the Government’s proposed conditions of release or detention 
not be ‘excessive’ in light of the perceived evil.” Id. at 754. 
The Court’s reasoning treats “bail” not narrowly, but broadly 
as “release before trial . . . conditioned upon the accused’s 
giving adequate assurance[s].” Stack, 342 U.S. at 4. 
(Similarly, we have previously described bail as reconciling 
“pretrial liberty with the need to assure the defendant’s 
presence at trial,” Sistrunk, 646 F.2d at 68, and the Excessive 
Bail Clause as “applicable solely to . . . conditions of release 
or detention designed to assure a criminal defendant’s 
appearance at trial . . . ,” Perry, 788 F.2d at 112.) 
With this understanding, we consider Holland’s 
argument that the Reform Act violates the Eighth 
Amendment because it bars a New Jersey court from 
considering or offering criminal defendants monetary bail 
alongside restrictive conditions such as home detention and 
electronic monitoring. Under an original meaning, even 
assuming there is a “right to bail,” we have already noted it 
did not contemplate monetary bail as Holland describes it, 
i.e., cash bail or corporate surety bond. Neither does a 
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contemporary definition of bail mean exclusively monetary 
bail; non-monetary conditions of release are also “bail.” 
Holland further argues that, under a broad definition of 
“bail,” the Reform Act would violate the Eighth Amendment 
by subjecting defendants to home detention and electronic 
monitoring “when monetary bail would suffice.” Appellants’ 
Br. at 39 n.1. In effect, he asserts the Eighth Amendment’s 
prohibition of excessive bail is violated when there is a less 
restrictive alternative to the conditions of release ordered by a 
court. But that is not the test articulated by Salerno; for those 
conditions, however restrictive, to violate the Eighth 
Amendment, they must be “excessive in light of the perceived 
evil.” Salerno, 481 U.S. at 754 (quotation marks omitted); see 
also United States v. Gardner, 523 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1031 
(N.D. Cal. 2007). Holland’s release conditions are hardly 
excessive in light of the State’s legitimate interest in 
addressing his risk of flight and risk of danger to others; the 
existence of a purportedly less restrictive means does not bear 
on whether the conditions are excessive. 
Holland also claims the Reform Act violates the 
Excessive Bail Clause because it imposes severe restrictions 
on “all defendants[’]” pretrial liberty except those who can be 
released on their own recognizance.8 Appellants’ Br. at 36. 
This statement and Holland’s claim that the Reform Act 
“authoriz[es] severe liberty restrictions of non-dangerous 
                                              
8 Holland further argues on appeal that the Reform Act 
imposes severe restrictions on all defendants without any 
heightened showing of dangerousness, thus violating the 
Excessive Bail Clause. Whether a heightened showing ought 
to be required is not properly before us because it was not 
raised in the District Court. Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 
552, 556 (1941). 
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defendants” misconstrue the Act’s statutory requirements. Id. 
at 38 (emphasis in original). The conditions of release 
imposed on Holland may only be applied if they are the “least 
restrictive . . . conditions that the court determines will 
reasonably assure [his] appearance in court when required 
[and] the protection of the safety of any other person or the 
community . . . .” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:162–16(b)(2)(b). In 
practice this has resulted in pretrial monitoring level 3+ home 
detention and electronic monitoring being ordered for 8.3% of 
eligible defendants, far from “all defendants.” And if a court 
sought to impose home detention and electronic monitoring 
on a non-dangerous defendant who presents little risk of 
flight, it would have to contend with the Act’s command that 
only the least restrictive conditions reasonably assuring the 
Act’s goals may be imposed. If those conditions were 
excessive in light of the State’s legitimate interests, it would 
also come up against the Eighth Amendment’s proscription of 
excessive bail. This hypothetical scenario, we point out, does 
not concern Holland, who has not challenged his 
classification as a potentially dangerous defendant. 
Finally, though he waived his statutory right to a 
pretrial detention hearing, Holland still has an opportunity to 
argue for a change in his release conditions and potentially 
request that monetary bail be set. This requires a material 
change in circumstances justifying a modification. N.J. Ct. R. 
3:26–2(c)(2). 
In this context, Holland has not demonstrated a 
likelihood of success on the merits of his argument that the 
Excessive Bail Clause guarantees a right to monetary bail. 
Regardless whether the Clause incorporates a right to bail, the 
latter is not limited to cash bail or corporate surety bonds; it 
is, to repeat, “release before trial . . . conditioned upon the 
accused’s giving adequate assurance[s].” Stack, 342 U.S. at 4. 
The Clause does not dictate whether those assurances must be 
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based on monetary or non-monetary conditions. Hence the 
Eighth Amendment does not require a New Jersey court to 
consider monetary bail with the same priority as non-
monetary bail for a criminal defendant. 
B.  Fourteenth Amendment 
 
The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution 
forbids states from depriving “any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law . . . .” U.S. Const. 
amend. XIV. This provision contains both substantive and 
procedural components. Steele v. Cicchi, 855 F.3d 494, 501 
(3d Cir. 2017). Holland claims the Reform Act’s 
subordination of monetary bail violates both.  
 
1.  Substantive Due Process 
 
Substantive due process “limits what [the] government 
may do regardless of the fairness of [the] procedures that it 
employs,” id. at 501 (citation omitted), to “guarantee 
protect[ion] against government power arbitrarily and 
oppressively exercised,” id. (alteration in original) (quoting 
Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998)). To 
show a violation, Holland must first demonstrate that he has 
“been deprived of a particular interest that is protected by . . . 
substantive due process.” Id. (citation omitted) (quotation 
marks omitted). This requires “a careful description of the 
asserted fundamental liberty interest . . . ; vague generalities 
. . . will not suffice.” Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 775–
76 (2003) (quotation marks omitted); see also Washington v. 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997).9 
                                              
9 The State argues we should not engage in a substantive due 
process analysis because Holland’s claim is covered by the 
Eighth Amendment and/or the Fourth Amendment. For the 
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For a putative right to be “fundamental” under the Due 
Process Clause, it must be “deeply rooted in this Nation’s 
history and tradition,” Lutz v. City of York, Pa., 899 F.2d 255, 
267 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 
431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion)), or “implicit in 
the concept of ordered liberty,” id. (citation omitted); see also 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720–21. Both the Supreme Court and 
our Court have repeatedly warned that we cannot read these 
phrases too broadly to expand the concept of substantive due 
process, as “guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this 
uncharted area are scarce and open-ended.” Collins v. City of 
Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992). A court “is most 
vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals 
with judge-made constitutional law having little or no 
cognizable roots in the language or design of the 
Constitution.” Lutz, 899 F.2d at 267 (citation omitted).  
If the right is fundamental, its infringement must be 
“narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.” 
Chavez, 538 U.S. at 775; see also Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 
721 (citation omitted). But where fundamental rights or 
interests are not implicated or infringed, we typically require 
only a “legitimate state interest that the legislature could 
rationally conclude was served by the statute.” Nicholas v. 
Pa. State Univ., 227 F.3d 133, 139 (3d Cir. 2000) (citation 
omitted). 
We have previously held substantive due process 
protects freedom “from government custody, detention, or 
other forms of physical restraint prior to any determination of 
                                                                                                     
reasons contained in this opinion, those constitutional 
provisions do not protect Holland’s claim, and thus we 
proceed to our analysis of substantive due process. See Lewis, 
523 U.S. at 843. 
33 
 
guilt.” Steele, 855 F.3d at 502 (quoting Zadvydas v. Davis, 
533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001)) (quotation marks omitted); see 
also Perry, 788 F.2d at 112 (“[T]here is a substantive liberty 
interest in freedom from confinement.”). Nevertheless, “an 
arrestee’s right to freedom from pretrial detention is 
subordinated . . . where there has been an adjudication that 
detention is necessary because an arrestee presents an 
identified and articulable threat to an individual or the 
community . . . or to ensure [his or her] presence at trial . . . .” 
Steele, 855 F.3d at 502 (quoting Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750–51, 
and Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 523 (1979)) (quotation 
marks omitted); see also Perry, 788 F.2d at 113 (“[A] 
demonstration of dangerousness justifies deprivation of 
liberty by civil commitment without offending the substantive 
due process limitation upon government.”).  
Holland, however, claims substantive due process 
protects his right to have the option to deposit money or 
obtain a corporate surety bond to secure his future appearance 
before he may be subjected to “severe deprivations of pretrial 
liberty.” So “[w]e begin, as we do in all due process cases, by 
examining our Nation’s history, legal traditions, and 
practices.” Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 710.  
Holland has not pointed us to any evidence of cash bail 
or corporate surety bonds in early bail practice in the United 
States, nor did our search reveal any. Rather, both modern 
forms of bail appear to have emerged in the mid-to-late 
Nineteenth Century, largely as a product of the expansive 
frontier and urban areas in America diluting the personal 
relationships necessary for a personal surety system. 
Comment, Bail: An Ancient Practice Reexamined, 70 Yale 
L.J. 966, 967–68 (1961); Jonathan Drimmer, When Man 
Hunts Man: The Rights and Duties of Bounty Hunters in the 
American Criminal Justice System, 33 Hous. L. Rev. 731, 749 
(1996). With respect to cash bail, some jurisdictions deemed 
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the practice illegal because it would not secure the 
government’s interest in the accused appearing at trial.10 But 
by the Twentieth Century many jurisdictions (even if not yet 
states) enacted statutes to allow it in certain circumstances,11 
                                              
10 Butler v. Foster, 14 Ala. 323, 325–26 (1848); United States 
v. Faw, 1 Cranch C.C. 486, 486 (D.C. Cir. 1808); Smart v. 
Cason, 50 Ill. 195, 197 (1869); State v. Reiss, 12 La. Ann. 
166, 166–67 (1857) (“There is no law which authorizes a 
Sheriff to receive money as a security for the appearance of 
persons accused of crime. Where parties are admitted to bail 
under bonds and recognizances, they are not absolutely 
discharged, but are (as it were) transferred from the custody 
of the Sheriff to the friendly custody of the sureties in the 
bond or recognizance.”); People v. Rutan, 3 Mich. 42, 50–51 
(1853); Reinhard v. Columbus, 31 N.E. 35, 38 (Ohio 1892). 
 
11 Alaska Crim. Proc. Code ch. 23, § 229 (1900) (adopting 
law of Oregon); Ariz. Rev. Stat. tit. 12, ch. 5, § 1981 (1887); 
Ark. Code Prac. Civ. & Crim. Cases tit. 5, ch. 3, § 84 (1869); 
Cal. Crim. Proc. Code ch. 119, pt. 4, tit. 3, ch. 7, § 151 
(1850); Ind. Rev. Stat. ch. 4, art. 9, § 1706 (1881); Iowa Code 
pt. 4, tit. 25, ch. 196, § 3232 (1851); Kan. Stat. ch. 82, art. 9, 
§ 145 (1868); Ky. Crim. Code tit. 5, ch. 3, § 84 (1867); Mass. 
Gen. Laws pt. 4, tit. 2, ch. 212, § 68 (1882); Mont. Rev. Stat. 
div. 3, ch. 11, § 249 (1879); Nev. Rev. Stat. ch. 53, tit. 4, pt. 
10, § 2141 (1873); 1898 N.J. Laws 875; N.Y. Crim. Proc. 
Code pt. 4, tit. 11, ch, 1, art. 5, § 648 (1850); N.D. Rev. Crim. 
Proc. Code ch. 6, art. 5, § 7856 (1895); Okla. Stat. ch. 72, art. 
5, § 67 (1890); Or. Crim. Code tit. 1, ch. 25, § 1483 (1887); 
Tenn. Code pt. 4, tit. 4, ch. 10, art. 4, § 5167 (1857); Utah 
Code Ann. tit. 76, ch. 16, § 4662 (1898); Wash. Rev. Code 
ch. 83, § 1036 (1881); Wisc. Stat. tit. 33, ch. 195, § 4816 
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and others followed in the early and mid-Twentieth Century 
(including some jurisdictions that had previously barred it).12 
                                                                                                     
(1898); Cressey v. Gierman, 7 Minn. 398, 404 (1862) (citing 
state statute that permits defendants to deposit money in lieu 
of bail); Raisin Fertilizer Co. v. Grubbs, 19 S.E. 597, 597 
(N.C. 1894) (same). 
 
12 D.C. Code ch. 20, § 938 (1906); Idaho Penal Code tit. 23, 
ch. 235, § 5647 (1901); 37 Ill. Comp. Stat. ¶ 3363 (1920); La. 
Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 97 (1929); 1919 Mich. Pub. Acts 
332 (1919); S.D. Codified Laws tit. 11, ch. 11, § 590 (1903); 
Holcombe v. Pierce, 43 So. 2d 640, 642–43 (Ala. 1949) 
(noting 1949 Act amended Alabama Code to permit cash 
bail); Puchuneicz v. Chellis, 27 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 494, 495 
(1929) (noting Chapter 14, Section 8 of new criminal code 
allows for deposit of cash in lieu of recognizance); State ex 
rel. City of Beckley v. Roberts, 40 S.E.2d 841, 845 (W. Va. 
1946) (noting 1943 Act authorized cash bail). Compare Conn. 
Gen. Stat. tit. 20, ch. 13, pt. 3, § 1 (1875), with 1909 Conn. 
Pub. Acts ch. 72 (1909). Compare Fla Laws div. 5, pt. 2, tit. 
2, ch. 1, art. 2, § 3926 (1906), with Fla. Laws div. 5, pt. 2, tit. 
2, ch. 1, art. 2, § 3936a (1914). Compare Maine Rev. Stat. 
Ann. tit. 11, ch. 135, § 6 (1916), with Maine Rev. Stat. Ann. 
tit. 11, ch. 145, § 28 (1930). Compare R.I. Gen. Laws tit. 37, 
ch. 354, § 15 (1909), with R.I. Gen. Laws tit. 40, ch. 407, 
§ 6323 (1923). Compare S.C. Crim. Code tit. 1, ch. 2, § 28 
(1902), with S.C. Crim. Code tit. 1, ch. 2, § 37 (1912). 
Compare Va. Code. tit. 41, ch. 198, § 4972 (1918), with Va. 
Code tit. 41, ch. 198, § 4973a (1924). Compare Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. div. 5, tit. 2, ch. 2, § 5182 (1899), with Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
ch. 397, § 6087 (1910). Compare Commonwealth v. Fortini, 
27 Pa. D. 521, 522 (1918) (“[W]e have no statute in 
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Outside the statutes’ circumscribed scope, however, 
numerous jurisdictions made clear that cash bail was not 
available in common law as an alternative to obtaining a 
personal surety.13 Even through the 1950s a few jurisdictions 
had no statutory provision for cash bail, and we see no 
                                                                                                     
Pennsylvania that permits cash bail.”), with 1919 Pa. Laws 
102, § 2 (1919). Cash bail also became an option in Maryland 
and New Hampshire, but it is unclear whether its basis was 
statutory. Outerbridge Horsey Co. v. Martin, 120 A. 235, 
235–36 (Md. 1923); Rockingham Cty. v. Chase, 71 A. 634, 
635 (N.H. 1908). The same was true for the then-Territory of 
Hawaii. See Territory v. Ah Sing, 18 Haw. 470, 471 (1907). 
 
13 Paton v. Teeter, 37 Cal. App. 2d 477, 479 (Dist. Ct. App. 
1940) (holding cash bail may not be accepted in place of a 
surety absent a statutory provision authorizing such 
acceptance); Palakiko v. Cty. of Maui, 22 Haw. 759, 760 
(1915) (same); State v. Owens, 84 N.W. 529, 530 (Iowa 1900) 
(same); Applegate v. Young, 61 P. 402, 402 (Kan. 1900) 
(same); Badolato v. Molinari, 174 N.Y.S. 512, 514 (Crim. Ct. 
1919) (same); Exchange Trust Co. v. Mann, 269 P. 275, 276 
(Okla. 1928) (same); Brasfield v. Town of Milan, 155 S.W. 
926, 927 (Tenn. 1913) (same); Kellogg v. Witte, 182 P. 570, 
571 (Wash. 1919) (same). But see Rowan v. Randolph, 268 F. 
529, 530 (7th Cir. 1920) (holding a judge does not have the 
discretion to refuse to accept cash bail and require a surety in 
common law “where the penalty of the bond is payable in 
money” and the amount of the penalty was tendered upfront 
as security). 
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evidence its practice was accepted based on prior decisions 
not overturned.14  
Rather than a product of statute, by contrast it appears 
commercial bail bonding was a product of economic 
opportunity presented by the eroding personal surety system. 
The first bail bond business in the United States is widely 
thought to have formed in 1898 in San Francisco. The Old 
Lady Moves On, Time Mag., Aug. 18, 1941. By 1912 the 
Supreme Court recognized the permissibility of commercial 
contracts for bail bonds. Leary v. United States, 224 U.S. 567, 
575 (1912). But widespread criticism of the practice, leading 
to reform, shortly followed. A landmark study on the bail 
system in Chicago in the 1920s described rampant abuses in 
                                              
14 Lowrie v. Harvey, 10 P.2d 335, 335–36 (Colo. 1932) 
(noting no statutory provision for the acceptance of cash or its 
equivalent in lieu of bond); Scarboro v. State, 62 S.E.2d 168, 
170 (Ga. 1950) (“Indeed, even judicial or other officers who 
are empowered to admit persons accused of crime to bail[] 
have no right, in the absence of express statutory authority, to 
accept a deposit of money in lieu of bail or as a substitute for 
a recognizance, and the release upon the making of such a 
deposit, of a person held in custody under a criminal charge is 
illegal.”) (citation omitted); Cooper v. Rivers, 48 So. 1024, 
1025 (Miss. 1909) (noting no law authorizing sheriff to take 
money as a deposit in lieu of bail); Snyder v. Gross, 95 N.W. 
636, 637 (Neb. 1903) (“[A] deposit of money instead of the 
usual bail was not authorized.”). Compare Ga. Code Ann. 
§ 27–418 (1933), with Ga. Code Ann. § 17–6–4(a) (1982). 
Compare Dufek v. Harrison Cty., 289 S.W. 741, 742 (Tex. 
App. 1926) (noting cash bail not authorized), with Smith v. 
Decker, 312 S.W.2d 632, 634 (Tex. 1958) (noting option to 
deposit cash in 1957 Act).  
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professional bail bonding, including bondsmen’s failure to 
pay on forfeited bonds. Arthur L. Beeley, The Bail System in 
Chicago 39–44 (1927). Criticism of reliance on monetary 
bail, of which commercial bail bonding was a key feature, 
continued through the 1950s. By that time scholars had 
criticized the monetary bail system as discriminatory, 
arbitrary, and ill-suited to ensuring a defendant’s appearance 
in court. See Wayne H. Thomas, Jr., Bail Reform in America 
14–15 (1976). Ultimately, these concerns motivated federal 
and state governments to reform their bail laws to deprioritize 
monetary bail (including corporate surety bonds) under non-
monetary conditions of release. See Bail Reform Act of 1966, 
Pub. L. No. 89–465, § 2, 80 Stat. 214 (1966); see also S. Rep. 
98–225, at 5 n.7 (1983); Thomas at 181. 
Historical practice informs whether the option to post 
cash or obtain a corporate surety bond for bail is fundamental. 
Cf. Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 446 (1992). The 
“settled tradition” of cash bail we see in our nation’s history 
is that it is only available as an alternative to obtaining a 
personal surety when a statute so permits, and, in the absence 
of statutory permission, it is generally unavailable. Id. 
Additionally, we see no historical basis for a right to obtain a 
corporate surety bond, as this relatively modern practice was 
quickly limited by reform. Nor have we found any historical 
authority supporting an option to deposit money or obtain a 
corporate surety bond in lieu of the release conditions to 
which Holland agreed, namely, home detention and electronic 
monitoring. In sum, to the extent Holland contends there is a 
history of a “right to bail,” that right does not require cash 
bail or a corporate surety bond to be available as an 
alternative equal to other release conditions. 
 As we discern no historical basis for concluding 
substantive due process requires criminal defendants to have 
the option to post cash or obtain a corporate surety bond to 
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ensure their future appearance in court, id. at 448, we turn to 
whether either practice is “implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty.” Lutz, 899 F.2d at 267 (citation omitted). Holland 
contends bail is fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty 
because it ensures freedom before conviction for 
presumptively innocent defendants who pose little flight risk 
and no danger, and it enables them to prepare a more 
complete defense. To be sure, “bail constitutes a fundament 
of liberty underpinning our criminal proceedings,” Sistrunk, 
646 F.2d at 70, but we cannot say the same of Holland’s 
requested forms of monetary bail.  
Reliance on monetary bail, including cash bail and 
corporate surety bond, through the middle of the Twentieth 
Century came at a cost: criminal defendants who were unable 
to post or pay even modest sums to secure their release were 
kept in jail.  
The practice of admission to bail, as it has 
evolved in Anglo-American law, is not a device 
for keeping persons in jail upon mere 
accusation until it is found convenient to give 
them a trial. On the contrary, the spirit of the 
procedure is to enable them to stay out of jail 
until a trial has found them guilty. 
Stack, 342 U.S. at 7–8 (Jackson, J., concurring). Monetary 
bail often deprived presumptively innocent defendants of 
their pretrial liberty, a result that surely cannot be 
fundamental to preserving ordered liberty. 
As a result, we hold cash bail and corporate surety 
bond are not protected by substantive due process because 
they are neither sufficiently rooted historically nor implicit in 
the concept of ordered liberty. Hence the Reform Act’s 
subordination of monetary bail to non-monetary conditions of 
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release need only be rationally related to a legitimate State 
interest. And it is—New Jersey’s interests in ensuring 
defendants appear in court, do not endanger the safety of any 
person or the community, or obstruct their criminal process, 
are no doubt legitimate. See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750–51; 
Bell, 441 U.S. at 523; Steele, 855 F.3d at 502; Perry, 788 F.2d 
at 113. The State’s shift away from monetary bail as a 
primary option was designed to serve those interests: it found 
the reliance on monetary bail resulted in the release of 
defendants who had the means to pay regardless of their flight 
risk or danger, and the pretrial detention of poorer defendants 
even if they were accused of less serious crimes and posed 
little risk. JCCJ Report at 1–2. Reliance on non-monetary 
conditions of release instead of monetary bail thus allows the 
State to release low-risk defendants, who may be unable to 
afford to post cash or pay a bondsman, while addressing 
riskier defendants’ potential to flee, endanger the community 
or another person, or interfere with the judicial process that 
decrees their guilt or innocence.15  
2.  Procedural Due Process 
 
Pretrial release and detention decisions implicate a 
liberty interest—conditional pretrial liberty—that is entitled 
                                              
15 Though we do not apply strict scrutiny, it would appear that 
New Jersey’s reliance on non-monetary release conditions is 
more narrowly tailored than the system in place before the 
Reform Act. Holland’s argument to the contrary—that 
monetary bail is less restrictive of liberty than non-monetary 
bail—is belied by the early statistics on the Act. In its first 
year, New Jersey’s pretrial jail population was reduced by 
20%, whereas the non-monetary conditions to which Holland 
agreed were ordered for only 8.3% of eligible defendants. 
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to procedural due process protections. See United States v. 
Delker, 757 F.2d 1390, 1397 (3d Cir. 1985). But “not every 
potential loss of liberty requires the full panoply of procedural 
guarantees available at a criminal trial.” Id. “[D]ue process is 
flexible and calls for such procedural protection as the 
particular situation demands.” Id. (quoting Morrissey v. 
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)) (quotation marks omitted).  
 
Procedural due process requires us to balance three 
factors:  
 
First, the private interest that will be affected by 
the official action; second, the risk of an 
erroneous deprivation of such interest through 
the procedures used, and the probable value, if 
any, of additional or substitute procedural 
safeguards; and finally, the Government’s 
interest, including the function involved and the 
fiscal and administrative burdens that the 
additional or substitute procedural requirement 
would entail.  
 
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).  
 
The State asserts Holland waived any procedural due 
process argument because he opted out of the pretrial 
detention hearing that was available to him. To be sure, “[i]n 
order to state a claim for failure to provide due process, a 
plaintiff must have taken advantage of the processes that are 
available to him or her, unless those processes are unavailable 
or patently inadequate.” Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 116 
(3d Cir. 2000). That did not happen because Holland chose to 
forgo his right to the available hearing. But, for the sake of 
completeness, we nonetheless address his process 
contentions.  
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Holland argues the Reform Act violates procedural due 
process because it enables the State court to impose on 
criminal defendants home detention and electronic 
monitoring without having the option to impose monetary 
bail together with or in place of these non-monetary 
conditions. We do not decide whether non-monetary 
conditions such as home detention and/or electronic 
monitoring restrict criminal defendants’ pretrial liberty. Even 
assuming these conditions would satisfy the first balancing 
factor, the other two factors do not point to a violation of 
Holland’s right to procedural due process. 
 
We evaluate the deprivation risk to Holland’s pretrial 
liberty interest by considering “the fairness and reliability of 
the existing . . . procedures[] and the probable value, if any, of 
additional procedural safeguards.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 343. 
Due to the prosecutor’s pretrial detention motion, Holland 
had access to a pretrial detention hearing to determine 
whether he would be detained pretrial and, if not, what 
conditions of release would be imposed on him. The 
questions Holland poses are, first, whether the procedural 
protections supplied to him in this hearing were adequate 
given the Reform Act’s restrictions on a State court’s ability 
to set monetary bail, and, second, whether procedural due 
process requires the court to consider monetary bail in line 
with non-monetary conditions. 
 
We briefly restate the Reform Act’s existing 
procedures that applied to Holland had he taken advantage of 
them. Before the prosecutor brought a pretrial detention 
motion, Pretrial Services prepared a Public Safety 
Assessment and recommendation for release conditions that 
flagged him as a risk to commit new violent criminal activity. 
It recommended that he be detained pretrial. Following 
Pretrial Services’ recommendation, the prosecutor moved for 
pretrial detention; hence Holland was entitled under the 
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Reform Act to a pretrial detention hearing. At the hearing he 
had the right to counsel or to have counsel appointed, the 
opportunity to testify, present witnesses, cross-examine 
witnesses, and present information. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:162–
19(e)(1). He was also able to subpoena and call the State’s 
witnesses. ACLU Pretrial Justice Manual at 42. Further, rules 
concerning the admissibility of evidence in criminal trials did 
not apply to this hearing, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:162–19(e)(1), 
and Holland was entitled to receive significant discovery, 
including all exculpatory evidence, a copy of the charging 
documents, all statements and reports that relate to the 
affidavit of probable cause, plus any additional evidence the 
prosecutor relied on at the detention hearing to establish 
probable cause and to support any Public Safety Assessment. 
N.J. Ct. R. 3:4–2(c)(1); see also Robinson, 160 A.3d at 19. 
 
The court could then take into account various factors 
to determine whether any monetary or non-monetary release 
conditions, or combination of conditions, would reasonably 
assure not only Holland’s presence at trial but also the other 
goals of the Act. These factors include: the nature and 
circumstances of the offense charged; the weight of the 
evidence against Holland and the admissibility of any 
evidence sought to be excluded; his history and 
characteristics; the nature and seriousness of his 
dangerousness on pretrial release; and Pretrial Services’ 
recommendation of release or detention. N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 2A:162–20. If the court then decided against pretrial 
detention, it could have imposed only the least restrictive 
non-monetary condition or combination of conditions that 
would reasonably assure Holland’s presence at trial and the 
safety of the community and other persons, provided release 
on personal recognizance or an unsecured appearance bond 
would not reasonably assure those goals. Id. §§ 2A:162–
16(b)(2), 2A:162–17(a)–(b). Monetary bail, other than 
unsecured appearance bond, was an option only if non-
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monetary bail was found inadequate. Id. §§ 2A:162–
16(b)(2)(c), 2A:162–17(c)(1), (d)(1), 2A:162–18(a)(2). 
 
The Reform Act’s applicable procedures mirror those 
in the federal Bail Reform Act of 1984. In response to a facial 
challenge that the federal Bail Act failed to satisfy procedural 
due process before criminal defendants may be detained 
pretrial, the Supreme Court reviewed the Act’s procedures 
and held the “extensive safeguards suffice to repel a facial 
challenge.” Salerno, 481 U.S. at 752. It noted the Bail Act’s 
protections were “more exacting than those . . . found 
sufficient in the juvenile context, . . . and they far exceed[ed] 
what [the Court] found necessary to effect limited post[-
]arrest detention . . . .” Id. (citing Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 
253, 275–81 (1984); Gerstein, 420 U.S. 103).  
 
Salerno informs our view that the risk of erroneously 
depriving Holland’s pretrial liberty is low under the New 
Jersey Reform Act’s procedures given its subordination of 
monetary bail. All of the procedures the Court held were 
“extensive safeguards” under the federal Act are included in 
the New Jersey Act’s pretrial detention hearing. And the New 
Jersey Act adds the additional protection of extensive 
discovery.16 Beyond these extensive safeguards, the Reform 
Act allows only the least restrictive non-monetary condition, 
or combination of conditions, reasonably assuring the Act’s 
goals. Considering all the protections available to Holland 
under the Reform Act, the risk of erroneous deprivation of his 
                                              
16 Though Holland argues on appeal that procedural due 
process requires a heightened showing before a State court 
may order home detention and electronic monitoring, as 
required for pretrial detention, he did not raise this argument 
in the District Court, and thus it is not properly before us. See 
Hormel, 312 U.S. at 556. 
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pretrial liberty—ostensibly through the imposition of home 
detention and electronic monitoring—is low even if the court 
were unable to consider monetary bail. 
 
The probable value of requiring the court to consider 
monetary bail in line with home detention and electronic 
monitoring is also low. Holland contends that monetary bail 
preserves liberty, whereas home detention and electronic 
monitoring encumber it. Thus, the argument goes, giving the 
court the option to release criminal defendants on monetary 
bail in lieu of home detention and electronic monitoring 
would necessarily reduce the risk of an erroneous deprivation. 
His counsel also suggested during oral argument that the 
court should set monetary bail to account for any flight risk 
but still have the option to set restrictive non-monetary 
conditions to account for potential danger. Or. Arg. Tr. at 27. 
 
The first argument is refuted by the actual effect of the 
Reform Act; the second is hypothetical. New Jersey decided 
to shift from its prior monetary bail system because it resulted 
in more criminal defendants being detained in jail pretrial, 
and “civil detention . . . results in the deprivation of the most 
fundamental of all personal liberties.” Perry, 788 F.2d at 113. 
As noted above, in the year since the Act took effect New 
Jersey’s pretrial jail population was reduced significantly 
while home detention and/or electronic monitoring was 
ordered for few eligible defendants. CJR Report 2017, at 4; 
see Initial Release Decisions 2017. Monetary bail, as it 
existed in New Jersey prior to the Reform Act, resulted in 
more restrictions of criminal defendants’ pretrial liberty, not 
fewer. Additionally, the notion the court should set monetary 
bail to account for Holland’s flight risk, while also having the 
ability to set restrictive non-monetary conditions to account 
for his danger to others, would result in more than the non-
monetary bail conditions Holland accepted. Perhaps what he 
proposes is that using monetary bail to mitigate flight would 
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reduce the restrictiveness of the non-monetary conditions the 
court sets, thus reducing the risk of erroneous deprivation of 
liberty. If so, he provides no support for this hypothetical 
outcome. 
 
The final Mathews factor, the State’s interest, also 
indicates the Reform Act’s procedures, which subordinate 
monetary bail to non-monetary conditions of release, do not 
violate procedural due process. This factor includes the public 
interest, “the administrative burden and other societal costs 
that would be associated with [the additional] requir[ement]” 
along with financial costs to the State. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 
347. The Reform Act’s goals include not only the reasonable 
assurance of eligible defendants’ appearance at trial, but also 
the safety of the community and other persons, and the 
integrity of the criminal justice process. Holland does not 
contest that monetary bail fails to address his risk of danger. 
Thus the State’s strong and legitimate interest is not served by 
placing consideration of monetary bail in line with conditions 
designed to mitigate danger to other persons and the 
community. Moreover, the public interest also includes, 
broadly, pretrial liberty. As explained above, studies have 
revealed reliance on monetary bail results in greater 
encumbrance of pretrial liberty, as many pretrial detainees are 
kept in custody because of their inability to post even modest 
monetary bail. And the Reform Act has thus far been 
effective in reducing the pretrial detention population. Even if 
home detention and electronic monitoring may be considered 
restrictions on pretrial liberty, they may only be imposed if 
they are the least restrictive conditions that reasonably assure 
the Reform Act’s goals. Also of marginal note is the 
administrative burden of imposing an additional procedural 
requirement. The State posits that the burden of requiring the 
court to consider monetary bail in line with non-monetary 
conditions would include retraining court personnel, 
prosecutors, public defenders, and private defense attorneys, 
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and promulgating one or more new court rules, which would 
be financially and human-resource intensive. In any event, the 
State’s interest weighs against finding a violation of 
procedural due process. 
 
 Though we reach no holding on whether home 
detention and electronic monitoring impinge Holland’s 
pretrial liberty, we assume they do. Even so, we hold the 
lower priority of monetary bail to non-monetary bail 
conditions does not make constitutionally inadequate the 
extensive safeguards available to Holland under the Reform 
Act. Those procedures—together with the low probable value 
of requiring the court to consider monetary bail alongside 
home detention and electronic monitoring, and the State’s 
interest—indicate the subordination of monetary bail does not 
violate procedural due process, especially when Holland 
retains the option of seeking a modification of his bail 
conditions should circumstances change. 
 
* * * * * 
 
In sum, we hold the Reform Act’s subordination of 
monetary bail to non-monetary bail conditions does not 
violate either component of the Due Process Clause. 
Substantive due process does not provide a right to monetary 
bail. It is neither historically rooted to the time of our Bill of 
Rights nor implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, and the 
Reform Act’s subordination of it to non-monetary release 
conditions is rationally related to the State’s legitimate 
interests in assuring defendants appear at trial, the safety of 
the community and other persons, and the integrity of the 
criminal justice process. As for procedural due process, the 
extensive safeguards provided by the Reform Act are not 
made inadequate by its subordination of monetary bail. 
Moreover, Holland still may move the State court to modify 
his bail based on a change of circumstances, wherein he may 
48 
 
be able to argue he no longer presents a danger and thus the 
conditions of release imposed on him should be less 
restrictive. See N.J. Ct. R. 3:26–2(c)(2).  
 
C.  Fourth Amendment 
Unlike his Eighth Amendment and Due Process 
arguments, Holland does not argue the Fourth Amendment 
provides a right to monetary bail. Rather, he asserts the 
Reform Act violates the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of 
“unreasonable searches and seizures” because the conditions 
to which he agreed, i.e., home detention and electronic 
monitoring, are “unreasonable” inasmuch as they involve 
significant intrusions on his privacy and are not needed to 
promote the State’s legitimate interest when monetary bail 
would serve the same interest less intrusively.17 
The Fourth Amendment provides, in relevant part, that 
“[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated . . . .” U.S. Const. amend. IV. It 
is binding on the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 446 (2013). But not all 
                                              
17 Holland cursorily contends his release conditions were not 
based on reasonable suspicion or probable cause that he will 
commit a crime, but makes no argument to support this claim. 
Thus we do not address it on appeal. See Free Speech 
Coalition, Inc. v. Att’y Gen., 677 F.3d 519, 545 (3d Cir. 
2012). We also refrain from considering his argument that the 
State’s interest in home detention and electronic monitoring is 
unreasonable absent a heightened showing of dangerousness 
because it was not raised to the District Court. Hormel, 312 
U.S. at 556. 
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searches and seizures run afoul of it. “The touchstone of the 
Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.” Florida v. Jimeno, 
500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991). To determine whether a seizure is 
reasonable, we examine the totality of circumstances and 
balance “the nature and quality of the intrusion on the 
individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the 
importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the 
intrusion.” Schneyder v. Smith, 653 F.3d 313, 325 (3d Cir. 
2011) (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985) 
(internal citation omitted)). Likewise, to assess whether a 
search is reasonable, we balance “the degree to which [it] 
intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other hand, 
the degree to which [it] is needed for the promotion of 
legitimate governmental interests.” United States v. 
Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 182 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting United 
States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119 (2001)).  
We do not accept as given that placing an electronic 
monitor on an individual and then tracking his whereabouts 
always constitute a search and seizure, and that home 
detention is a seizure. In Grady v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 
1368 (2015), the Supreme Court held that “a State . . . 
conducts a search when it attaches a device to a person’s 
body, without consent, for the purpose of tracking that 
individual’s movements.” Id. at 1370 (emphasis added). 
Holland does not challenge on appeal the District Court’s 
finding that he consented to the conditions imposed on him. 
We are aware of no binding authority that holds consented-to 
tracking and consented-to home detention are a search and a 
seizure. 
Even assuming they are, we cannot estimate the extent 
to which they intrude on Holland’s privacy. Holland alleges 
the ankle bracelet he wears for monitoring purposes requires 
him to stay near a power outlet for several hours a day while 
the device charges, precludes him from traveling on a 
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commercial airplane, and discloses “a massive amount of 
private information about [his] life to the state.” Appellants’ 
Br. at 50. But the District Court did not find any facts that 
support an intrusion on privacy; rather, it assumed these 
practices are intrusive. We too assume without deciding they 
are at least somewhat intrusive.  
That intrusiveness, however, is lessened by Holland’s 
reduced expectation of privacy. “Once an individual has been 
arrested on probable cause for a dangerous offense that may 
require detention before trial, . . . his or her expectations of 
privacy and freedom from police scrutiny are reduced.” King, 
569 U.S. at 463. Holland does not challenge that he was 
arrested on probable cause for a dangerous offense, and thus 
we consider his expectation of privacy to be reduced.  
Against Holland’s reduced privacy interest we balance 
the State’s interest. The Supreme Court has held “the 
Government has a substantial interest in ensuring that persons 
accused of crimes are available for trials” and a “legitimate 
and compelling” interest in preventing crime by arrestees. Id. 
at 452–53 (citations omitted). These mirror the goals 
espoused by the State in the Reform Act, and Holland does 
not challenge the legitimacy of them. Rather, he argues the 
conditions are not reasonable because monetary bail could 
serve the same legitimate interests in a less intrusive manner. 
We repeat the State found monetary bail did not adequately 
address flight risk and could not, by its nature, address risk of 
danger.  
In any event, Holland’s argument fails as a matter of 
law because the Supreme Court “has repeatedly stated that 
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment does not require 
employing the least intrusive means . . . .” Bd. of Educ. of 
Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawotomie Cty. v. Earls, 536 
U.S. 822, 837 (2002); see also Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 
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640, 647 (1983). The existence of a less intrusive means does 
not itself render a search or seizure unreasonable. Whether 
the conditions to which Holland agreed are in themselves 
unreasonable, regardless of the availability or unavailability 
of monetary bail, is beyond the scope of our inquiry and in 
any event can be revisited if circumstances change.  
We hold Holland is unlikely to succeed on the merits 
of his argument that the Reform Act violates the Fourth 
Amendment because monetary bail could serve the same 
legitimate government interest in a less intrusive manner than 
the conditions to which he agreed. The Supreme Court has 
repeatedly disavowed a “less intrusive means” standard for 
determinations of reasonableness under the Fourth 
Amendment, see Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 647, and we will not 
adopt one here. 
V. Conclusion 
 
Holland has standing to bring his claims that the 
Reform Act violates the Eighth, Fourteenth, and Fourth 
Amendments of the United States Constitution, but Lexington 
does not. He has not, however, made a threshold showing of 
the first two factors required to prevail on a motion for a 
preliminary injunction. He has not demonstrated a sufficient 
likelihood of success on the merits of his argument that the 
Reform Act violates a constitutional right to cash bail or 
corporate surety bonds. We find no right to these forms of 
monetary bail in the Eighth Amendment’s proscription of 
excessive bail nor in the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive 
and procedural due process components. We also reject 
Holland’s “less intrusive means” theory of a Fourth 
Amendment violation, and so we hold he has not made a 
sufficient showing of a violation of that constitutional 
amendment. Without a constitutional right violated, and with 
reconsideration of current release conditions an option if 
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circumstances suggest and a request made, irreparable harm 
does not exist. Thus we affirm the District Court’s denial of 
Holland’s motion for a preliminary injunction. 
